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Northern Ireland’s Property Market Crisis: 
Insights from Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis 
 
Abstract 
The financial crisis of 2007 has shown that standard mainstream macroeconomic models underpinned 
by general equilibrium theory fail to anticipate, explain and provide guidance on how to respond to such 
events (Stiglitz, 2011).  Evidence in the Northern Ireland context has further suggested that applying 
these models to property markets may be inappropriate given the underlying statistical properties of 
these time series (Gallagher et al., 2015). These issues combined suggest that there may be merit in 
examining cases of financial crises through alternative theoretical frameworks and in adopting a more 
pluralist approach. With this in mind, this paper investigates whether Minsky’s (1975, 1986, 1992) 
Financial Instability Hypothesis can assist in understanding the recent property market crisis in 
Northern Ireland, which was severe by both national and international standards. Using qualitative 
evidence to analyse the behaviours of borrowers represented by property developers and lenders 
represented by banks over the course of the business cycle, this paper assesses the relevance of Minsky’s 
arguments. The findings show that Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis explains the incidents 
observed in NI’s property market in recent years.  
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1. Introduction 
There has been much criticism of the failure of standard mainstream macroeconomic models to predict 
and explain the recent crisis of 2007 (Krugman, 2009; Dow, 2012; Keen, 2013). The main problems 
stem from their microeconomic foundations, which, being underpinned by neoclassical theory, typically 
assume that individuals behave rationally and that markets are inherently stable. Despite a large body 
of evidence illustrating that individuals and markets often behave in a manner inconsistent with the 
standard mainstream view, much of recent macroeconomic modelling continues to preclude this 
(Stiglitz, 2011). By their very nature, these models do not anticipate large economic fluctuations and 
have limited capacity when it comes to explaining them. Crisis periods – if they can occur- are viewed 
as only temporary departures from equilibrium and it is assumed that they arise from exogenous shocks. 
Therefore, as became apparent when the recent crisis broke, standard mainstream macroeconomic 
models are of limited value in predicting and explaining such events. Subsequently, there has been a 
revival of interest in alternative theories and models of financial crises.  
Most notably in recent years many references have been made to the works of Kindleberger (1978) and 
Minsky (1975; 1986; 1992). Kindleberger’s (1978) theory of financial crises argues that individuals and 
markets may suffer from episodes of irrationality which can cause temporary deviations from 
fundamentals. Kindleberger’s (1978, p.6) theory could be viewed as an extension of a neo-Keynesian 
approach to include temporary episodes of disequilibrium. According to Kindleberger (1978), in most 
periods traditional mainstream macro-modelling techniques remain appropriate. Minsky’s (1975; 1986; 
1992) Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) on the other hand adopts more of a new-Keynesian 
viewpoint. It maintains that financial crises arise endogenously due to pro-cyclical movements in the 
supply of credit and argues that markets in capitalist economies are inherently unstable. Consequently, 
according to Minsky (1975; 1986; 1992) classical economics and associated deductive quantitative 
techniques are of limited value. Minsky’s theory thus implies that there is a need to adopt a more 
pluralist approach when examining financial crises.  
This paper builds on this emerging body of work focusing on alternative theories of financial crises.  It 
shows through qualitative insights that Minsky’s FIH explains the incidents observed in the Northern 
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Ireland (NI) property market in recent years. As detailed below, the recent crisis in NI was one of the 
most severe experienced by an UK region and it represents one of the worst documented internationally 
(Ramsey, 2015). Despite this it has received relatively little attention in the academic literature. This 
paper thereby makes a number of important contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, the 
behaviours of key economic agents over the course of the business cycle are examined through the lens 
of Minsky’s theory of financial crises and key behavioural factors that could be used as policy triggers 
in future are identified. NI’s property market crisis is further understood and it enables us to potentially 
avoid repetition by drawing wider lessons from the experience. Secondly, by showing that Minsky’s 
FIH could have explained the incidents observed in NI’s property market, it lends further support to the 
growing body of work that advocates the need to adopt alternative approaches to mainstream economic 
thinking, to pre-empt future financial crises (Colander et al., 2009; Lawson, 2009; Dow et al., 2012).   
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background to the NI property market crisis.  
Section 3 summarises mainstream economic theories of financial crises and then outlines the leading 
alternative theories of financial crisis of Kindleberger and Minsky. Section 4 details the methodology. 
Section 5 presents the findings and these are discussed in light of Minsky’s FIH in Section 6. The final 
section, Section 7, then provides some concluding remarks.     
2. Background 
NI is the smallest region of the United Kingdom (UK)1 and the only region that shares a land border 
with the Republic of Ireland (ROI) rather than mainland UK. Historically the region was characterised 
by political instability and suffered economically due to the decline of traditional industry and 
difficulties in attracting foreign investment to the region (Ruane and Todd, 1996). The establishment of 
a new devolved political regime in the 1990’s brought peace to the region (Mulholland, 2003). This 
coupled with more favourable macroeconomic conditions meant that the NI economy performed 
relatively well from the 1990’s onwards. 
NI has traditionally boasted high levels of home ownership (73% at its peak in 2003 (NIHE, 2015)) and 
like all other regions of the UK it has been negatively affected by the recent property market crisis of 
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2007.  Yet the experience of NI has been distinct in comparison to the other regions of the UK2. As 
Gibb et al. (2012) note during the upturn, specifically between 2005 Q2 to 2007 Q3, house price growth 
in the UK was circa 17%, while during the same period in NI house prices grew by circa 95%. 
Consequently, the downturn was also more pronounced in the region with all indices indicating peak-
to-trough (2007 Q3-2013 Q1) declines of over 40%, with some depicting over 50%3 (Ramsey, 2015).  
A decline of this magnitude was unprecedented in the UK context prior to this; it represents one of the 
worst documented internationally. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) find from their analysis of past house 
price crashes an average peak-to-trough decline of 35.5%. Their findings illustrate the severity of the 
case and place the NI experience amongst one of the worst house price declines recorded.  
<<INSERT FIGURE 1>> 
Evidence has also shown that during the recent property market bubble house prices in NI where most 
likely explosive and thus departed from strict martingale behaviour that is typically present during 
normal market conditions (Gallagher et al., 2015). The presence of such non-standard statistical 
properties means that conventional econometric approaches may not be appropriate to analyse the case. 
For example, co-integration analysis, a commonly employed approach when estimating long-run 
relationships (equilibrium) and short run adjustments (disequilibrium) among macroeconomic variables 
implies that a long-run economic relationship exists between two co-integrated variables and that it 
remains constant over the sample period (Engle and Granger, 1987; Engle and Yoo, 1987; Johansen, 
1988). However, the presence of explosive behaviour like that documented in the case of NI, indicates 
that such a long run equilibrium relationship may not exist. Therefore, estimating a co-integration based 
model may lead to incorrect conclusions being drawn regarding the existence of relationships between 
variables when it does not (Phillips and Lee, 2016). At a general level, the unstable nature of housing 
markets can also be seen through a simple examination of historical long run averages in such markets. 
As Knoll et al. (2017) show many housing markets globally show signs of increasing volatility in recent 
years. This likely instability in the market reinforces the need to adopt an alternative approach when 
examining the NI experience. 
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3. Theories of Financial Crises 
3.1 Mainstream Theories of Financial Crises 
While many theories on financial crises have been developed over the past number of decades, the 
standard mainstream view of financial crises is underpinned by neo-classical theory. The 
macroeconomic models that embrace this approach are typically developed within a general equilibrium 
framework and are built on the assumptions that individuals behave rationally and markets are 
inherently stable. Crisis periods - if they can occur - are viewed as only temporary departures from 
equilibrium arising from unanticipated exogenous shocks. The recent crisis has illustrated this position 
can be strongly criticised both on philosophical (Foley, 2004) and methodological grounds (Dow, 
2012).  Evidence has shown these models can fail to anticipate major economic events and offer limited 
insight into how to effectively overcome them (Toporowski, 2010). As noted above, this has led to a 
renewed interest in alternative theories of financial crises, in particular those put forward by Minsky 
and later Kindleberger that focus more on the structural characteristics of capitalist economies. 
3.2 Kindleberger’s Theory of Financial Crises 
Both Kindleberger’s and Minsky’s theories build on Keynes (1936) key insights however, as noted in 
the introduction Kindleberger’s (1978) theory of financial crises could be viewed as an extension of a 
neo-Keynesian approach. This is because it represents an attempt to synthesis Keynes’s key insights, 
on investment and the factors that determine it, with a neo-classical perspective. Underpinned by the 
IS-LM (Hicks-Hansen) model, the neo-Keynesian approach maintains that over the long run markets 
behave according to the neoclassical view tending towards equilibrium; while in the short run shocks 
may lead to disequilibrium and consequently markets may behave in a manner more consistent with 
Keynes’s ideas. This position thus argues that with appropriate policy intervention an economy will 
behave according to general equilibrium theory on the most part.  
Kindleberger’s (1978) international theory of financial crises embraces these ideas, in his own words 
“markets generally work but occasionally they break down” (Kindleberger, 1978, p.6). According to 
Kindleberger (1978) a bubble is initiated from an exogenous shock or “displacement” to the 
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macroeconomic system, the nature of which varies from crisis to crisis. This changes the economic 
outlook and brings new profit opportunities.  An influx of heterogeneous investors – initially insiders 
and later outsiders - with overly-optimistic expectations characterise the rise period and create a self-
fulfilling cycle in the short run (Passotti and Vercelli, 2015). Influenced by the “euphoria” and 
attempting to fulfil rising demand financial institutions increasingly finance risker investment. 
Consequently, price inflation continues until the peak when market expectations shift and some signal 
triggers a reversal in behaviour. Then the crash phase commences and as investors off-load their assets 
a sense of pessimism spreads. This causes asset prices to deflate. Kindleberger’s (1978) theory thus 
attributes a key role to psychological factors and their influence on behaviours in driving a financial 
crisis.   
3.3 Minsky’s Theory of Financial Crises 
Minsky does not adopt a Hicks-Hansen interpretation of Keynes’s general theory but rather considers 
Keynes’s theory to be an endogenous theory of financial crises. Adopting a Khan-Keynes view on 
money markets Minsky argues that financial instability plays a crucial role in the development of 
financial crises. As he stated “the missing step in the standard Keynesian theory is the explicit 
consideration of capitalist finance within a cyclical and speculative context...finance sets the pace for 
the economy” (Minsky, 1975, p.129). This position is outlined in his well-established FIH (Minsky 
1975, 1986, 1992). In this, Minsky (1992) describes the changing nature of the relationship between 
capital, investment and finance over the course of the business cycle and argues that the increasing 
process of interconnectedness and indebtedness that occurs between economic agents (individuals, 
firms and intermediaries/real and financial sectors) gives rise to instability.  
Minsky first identified three income-debt relationships that economic agents adopt which impact on the 
overall stability of an economy namely, hedge, speculative or Ponzi. In a hedge unit cash flow and 
income from investments are sufficient to fulfil any contractual obligations in every period (i.e. 
sufficient to repay debt and interest). A hedge unit’s viability depends only on the normal functioning 
of the product and labour market from which it derives its cash flow (Pollin, 1997). Economic units that 
adopt a speculative position experience some periods when obligations exceed cash flows and income. 
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These units will usually be able to meet the payment commitments on the “income account” on their 
liabilities but often cannot repay the principal (Minsky, 1992, p.7). Such units depend on both the 
normal functioning of financial markets and the product and labour markets in which they are based to 
remain solvent (Pollin, 1997). For agents, that adopt Ponzi positions, in most periods, cash 
commitments are much greater than cash flows and they can neither repay the principal or interest on 
outstanding debts. Many of these unit’s assets yield little or no income and are fully reliant on capital 
appreciation and the availability of debt for refinancing and sustaining their organisations. This position 
is the most fragile because as Pollin (1997, p. 81) notes these units are heavily “exposed to the vagaries 
of money markets”. Minsky argues that the overall stability of an economy is dependent on the 
proportions of each of these units within it. If an economy dominated by hedge units then it is likely to 
be stable. In contrast, the higher the proportion of speculative and Ponzi units, the more unstable an 
economy as it will be less capable of absorbing shocks. Therefore, according to Minsky’s view an 
economy has financing regimes under which it is a stable and financing regimes under which it is 
unstable.  
Minsky also maintains that as a capitalist economy enjoys a prolonged period of prosperity it transitions 
to a financing regime that leaves it vulnerable (i.e. an economy characterised by a large number of 
speculative and Ponzi units). Beginning at the trough of the business cycle, Minsky (1982) explains that 
both realised profits and profit expectations remain at low levels because the downturn would have 
forced the majority of overleveraged units into bankruptcy. Consequently, borrowers and lenders 
remain cautious regarding debt/equity ratios and asset valuations and only finance conservative 
investment projects. At this point an economy is robust as it is characterised predominantly by hedge 
units. As new profit opportunities arise, the economy begins to ascend out of the trough and the recovery 
takes hold. A boom gets underway and realised profits increasingly exceed expectations, prompting 
agents to revise their future growth expectations. Eventually “animal spirits” similar to those described 
by Keynes (1936) are ignited and there is a decline in risk aversion further increasing investment and 
accelerating growth. Firms become increasingly more willing to borrow as speculation on assets is 
profitable and lenders more willing to lend in pursuit of profit opportunities. Hence the boom is fuelled 
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and sustained by an expansion of credit which leads to an economy increasingly characterised by 
speculative and Ponzi units. The cycle continues underpinned by a sense of “euphoria” until the growth 
rate of debt outpaces that of profit. The system becomes increasingly more fragile and exposed to a debt 
deflationary downturn. Thus, according to Minsky a capitalist economy will repeatedly proceed through 
this cyclical process, in the absence of intervention, as a result of inherent dynamics. In Minsky’s (1992, 
p.6) own words; “the financial system swings between robustness and fragility and these swings are an 
integral part of the process that generates business cycles”. 
3.4 A Comparison of the Alternative Theories   
While studies often attempt to draw parallels between Kindleberger’s (1978) and Minsky’s (1975, 1986, 
1992) theories on financial crises (Rosser et al., 2012; Rapp, 2009) there are major differences between 
their two viewpoints. These have important implications when it comes to analysing and modelling 
financial crises.  Kindleberger views disequilibrium in markets as a temporary state arising from 
exogenous shocks which is more in line with the standard approach in economics (Passotti and Vercelli, 
2015). Kindleberger’s approach thus represents an attempt to illustrate that Keynesian theory can 
encompass periods of explosion in the system. If this is the case, then traditional neo-classical based 
quantitative modelling techniques are appropriate most of the time. Whereas, Minsky does not view 
instability as a transient state but rather as an inherent feature of any capitalist economy. The central 
tenet of Minsky’s FIH is that capitalism is inherently unstable and that capitalist structures move from 
states of stability to fragility over the course of the business cycle. According to Minsky (1975, p.68) 
“Keynesian economics as the economics of disequilibrium is the economics of permanent 
disequilibrium”. Therefore, in Minsky’s view classical economics is of limited value as capitalist 
economies are too unstable to be modelled using traditional static equilibrium based quantitative 
techniques. In fact, Minsky (1975, p.40) described the IS-LM framework under which Kindleberger 
operates as an “unfair and naive representation of Keynes’s subtle and sophisticated views”. In line with 
Minsky’s position and given the unstable nature of NI house prices over the periods (discussed earlier 
in section 2), this paper adopts a qualitative approach in analysing the crisis in NI.   
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4. Methodology 
Adopting a qualitative research methodology enabled the researchers to gather insights on the 
behaviours of key economic actors over the course of the business cycle in the NI context and to 
consider these in light of Minsky’s theory.  A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
property developers (n=10) and bank managers (n=10). The sample of property developers consisted of 
actors of varying sizes operating across the region of NI. The sample of bank managers included senior 
managers from the credit departments of five major banks operating in NI over the period. The use of 
the two strata facilitated the triangulation of the findings. Interviews were conducted until additional 
data did not generate any new insights into the issue. The combined sample (n=20)4 was deemed 
sufficient in size enabling the researchers to capture the behaviours of both lenders and borrowers 
operating in the region over the course of the business cycle.  
Convenience sampling was used to secure the interviews. The researchers initially exploited their own 
personal networks and further secured interviews through adopting a chain referral or snowball 
sampling approach.  This is a technique whereby respondents identify further participants who can 
inform the study based on their characteristics or knowledge of the research area (Bienacki and Waldorf, 
1981). This approach is considered to be particularly applicable when recruiting “hard to reach” or 
“hidden” populations. It was therefore suitable in the context of this study as it involved accessing 
participants willing to discuss or disclose commercially sensitive and/or private matters.  
To ensure consistency, standardised and well-structured interview protocols were developed in advance 
and utilised throughout the study. In the case of the property developers these contained a range of 
questions relating to firm characteristics, market behaviours and financing patterns both prior to 2007 
and post 2007. In the case of the banks, these contained questions relating to market position, portfolio 
composition, lending products, policies and practices in regard to commercial lending prior to 2007 and 
post 2007. Given the nature of the research, the anonymity of the participants is maintained. The 
timeliness of the research, the use of the standardised interview protocols alongside robust interviewing 
techniques reduced the threat of recall bias among the participants. 
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All of the interviews were conducted face-to-face and ranged in length from 40 minutes to 2.5 hours. 
Each interview was digitally recorded and later transcribed verbatim. The interview transcripts were 
subject to thematic content analysis that closely followed the approach proposed by Ryan and Bernard 
(2003). This included pawing through the interview transcriptions and analysing the data using a variety 
of techniques including repetitions, indigenous typologies, metaphors and analogies, transitions, 
linguistic connectors, similarities and differences and key words in context.  
The findings obtained from these interviews are outlined below.  These findings are structured around 
timeframes identified through the narratives provided by the participants and serve to assist with 
identifying how behaviours altered over the course of the business cycle. In outlining the findings, a 
summary of the views expressed is provided alongside a series of quotes from the transcripts.   
5. An Analysis of the Crisis in NI  
5.1 The Behaviour of Property Developers and Banks: 1990s and early 2000s 
All of the property developers interviewed (n=10) emphasised that during the 1990s and early 2000s 
their businesses were strong financially. They outlined solid investment strategies centred on 
purchasing land or property for development or rent as exemplified in the following responses; “The 
strategy would have been to buy property or land, develop it and turn the property” (PG6) and “Our 
business was initially based on rent…Buy this, rent it out” (PD5). Respondents stated, and most (n=7) 
illustrated through their financial records, that their businesses maintained robust cash flows capable of 
servicing any outgoings or debt commitments due to the nature of their business models.  
Their financing arrangements appeared to remain largely conservative with most (n=7) having 
committed to loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of 70% or below or indicating that investments at this stage 
were only part debt financed. For example, one property developer explained, “Prior to 2002-2003, 
anything you were purchasing was usually on a 70:30 split. The bank put in 70% and you were 
physically putting in 30% of whatever you were purchasing” (PD2) while another stated, “Back then 
there may have been a bit of bank money but it was mostly self-financed… part cash and part bank 
financed” (PD5). 
11 
 
Interviews conducted with the banks also indicate that financial institutions, while increasingly active 
in the commercial property market, remained cautious. A number of the managers (n=4) commented 
that “traditionally” or “prior to the 2000s” LTV ratios at the commercial end had been more restrictive 
and offered up to a “maximum of 70%” or as one interviewee put it, “70-75% was the maximum for 
everybody” (BBI2). This illustrates the conservative nature of these economic agents regarding debt 
levels over this period also. 
5.2 Behaviour of Property Developers and Banks: Early 2000s – 2004/2005 
Key changes in the behaviours and financing patterns of the property developers were identified from 
early 2000. Firstly, seven of the developers indicated a shift in business model with increasing emphasis 
being placed on the probability of resale rather than development or rental potential. The buying and 
selling of land appeared to become a key feature of the market also with nine of the developers drawing 
attention to the escalating price due to increased demand. As illustrated in the following responses:  
“Whenever, the property market took off, the money wasn’t in building anymore. It was sort of 
in the buying and selling of it. Well, the easy money was anyways” (PD5) 
 “I would sell on. What these boys [other developers] were giving. It wouldn’t pay you to 
develop, the prices they were giving” (PD1).  
The primary reasons put forward for this behavioural change related to the increasingly competitive 
nature of the market due to the entry of new non-traditional or inexperienced actors. References to 
everyone “jumping on the bandwagon” or “jumping on the gravy train” were common among the 
developers in relation to post 2000. Three of the larger scale developers also discussed the increasing 
prevalence of the practice of flipping within the market. This is an approach whereby agents purchase 
land/property off plan and quickly re-sell at a premium rate. This is illustrated in the comment below: 
“Flipping did happen a lot. Again with hindsight, it was probably one of the problems that we 
had with the period because in any one day, from being sold from the farmer to the end user, it 
could have gone through three sets of hands…. You know just paperwork…The value would 
have increased each time but in reality, it was only worth the first purchase price” (PD2).  
These behaviours both indicate an increasingly speculative market.   
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Financing patterns also changed significantly over this period. Post 2000 was described as “the period 
of freer finance” (PD2) with eight of the developers remarking that from this point in time they relied 
more heavily on debt finance and that they had “no problem getting access to finance”. The availability 
and use of higher LTV ratios and interest only loans became commonplace. For example, one developer 
described how he financed his activities over this period as follows: “Mostly financed through bank 
lending, commercial. And mostly short term debt. It was mainly interest only but at the time there was 
no talk of whether they [the loans] were for 12 months or if they were for 10 years” (PD1). Another 
developer referred to his interest-only roll-up facilities as “anniversary letters” (PD7) indicating his 
increased reliance on interest-only based debt financing instruments.  Developers (n=5) also commented 
that their ability to repay the principle on the loans obtained over this period was in part contingent on 
property/land prices continuing to rise. For example, one respondent commented: 
“Being interest-only allowed you to buy more because your payments were less…And because 
everything was going up you thought it’s alright, it doesn’t matter, you will be able to pay this 
off whenever you want” (PD2).   
The interviews with the bank managers provided further information regarding the shift in financing 
behaviours that occurred over this period.  The majority (n=8) of the bank managers interviewed 
discussed the increasing concentration of lending in the property market and/or the gradual lowering of 
standards or relaxation of core policies in regard to commercial lending over this period. One neatly 
summarised the situation as “I think every one of the banks was doing it. It was a bit of, if you weren’t 
doing it, you weren’t in the market or getting anything…everyone got caught up in the same excitement” 
(BDI1). Five of the bank officials commented specifically on an increasingly lack of robustness in terms 
of the commercial credit assessment processes implemented and raised concerns regarding the 
ineffective screening and oversights. This is exemplified in the following responses;  
“You found that a lot of lending that did go bad, when it came down to it there were other issues 
that arose. Maybe the paperwork wasn’t quite right, maybe things were left out of the sanction 
letters, maybe the security wasn’t taken properly and the charge in the property or land wasn’t 
properly executed” (BBI1)   
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“There may have been a bit of lethargy. There certainly was some complacency. There was 
overconfidence. So how deep did we go? In some cases, it was maybe just a case of if this guy 
wants to buy a £2million asset and if you put £500,000 with it, we will do the £1.5million- let’s 
just get on with it” (BAI3).  
Similar to the property developers, bank managers also commented on the adoption of increasingly 
riskier products and policies post 2000. This behaviour change was nicely summarised by one 
individual who stated, “there was a total shift in attitude to risk in the sector from that stage” (BEI1). 
The rise of LTV ratios over this period towards 100% illustrates the change in risk appetite of lenders. 
This meant borrowers required little or no real commitment other than the underlying collateral and a 
common view among respondents was that this had enticed “less experienced” individuals into the 
marketplace and encouraged speculative behaviour. The increasing use of BTLs, demand and bridging 
loans with interest roll-up potential and the shift to risker asset value based lending (which were 
dependent on the continuing escalation of property and land prices) were also highlighted.   
Interviews conducted with the banks indicated higher emphasis was placed on relationship building 
when assessing commercial clients’ eligibility for loans post 2000. Interviewees (n=5) explained how 
often the relationship between the bank and the borrower took precedence over the predetermined 
lending criteria - again highlighting the speculative nature of the market. For example, one senior 
manager noted that “a person’s character and stuff was a bigger factor during the boom” (BBI1) while 
another described how the potential for a long term relationship had adversely impacted on the bank’s 
decision making as follows:  
“There were certainly instances where we looked at deals and we approved loans based on 
customer relationship and based on looking at the long term relationship to a bank.…So if they 
had a large commercial business with us or other things then, we would have looked at maybe 
overriding the decision because something was going to come down the line that makes it 
affordable to them” (BCI2).   
Increasing competition amongst financial institutions due to the entrance and aggressiveness of foreign 
lenders in the market was the principle reason put forward for these changes. This is illustrated in the 
following remark:  
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“We had a lot of externals dipping their toes in the market like bossy [Bank of Scotland], RBS, 
HSBC and god knows who else but they wouldn’t have been very prevalent on the ground. They 
would have had one guy bouncing around cold calling or making himself available and you 
would have had these companies making deals at low margins, relatively high LTVs and doing 
so at minimal contact” (BAI3).  
5.3 The Behaviour of Property Developers and Banks: 2004 Onwards 
The property developers interviewed, again indicated a change in investment strategy circa 2005 to 
what could be described as a “buy to hold” approach. Six of the respondents made reference to land 
banking and stock piling on a vast scale as exemplified in the following comments: 
“It was just a matter of getting more stock, so that I am in control of that and that…It was sort 
of a hoarding of stock regardless of what you paid for it” (PD2).  
“That is when the greed came in, from then on….it was just land bank, land bank, land bank.” 
(PD6).  
This approach involved delaying time to market capitalising on appreciation. For example, one 
developer recalled the moment he first adopted such an approach:  
“We were selling houses but by the time we had them sold, the guy [original purchaser] was 
taking them and putting them on the market and getting £15,000 profit on each of them, even 
though it took us 6 or 7 months to build the houses. And when we realised that about 2006, we 
just wouldn’t sell” (PD4).  
A remark that is representative of the comments made by the six developers in this regard is as follows: 
“the amount of profit would be reflected in the length of time that you held it [property or land]” (PD2). 
Overall, the general consensus among the respondents appeared to be that the market was driven by 
speculation from the mid-2000s onwards and the rationale for the change in investment strategy was 
based on the perception that prices would continue to increase. It appeared that developers became 
completely reliant on capital appreciation to sustain their operations and to meet debt obligations. This 
is exemplified in the following comments: 
“The price that was paid for land didn’t work when we bought it but we reckoned that by next 
year houses would be up 20% so it will work out then. There was this sort of perception that 
things were just going to keep rising” (PD2).  
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“It was speculative in nature because the yields didn’t add up. The rent wasn’t covering the 
loans in most cases so you were purely basing it on capital appreciation…The capital 
appreciation was there before 2007 so it was all stacking up then…It was going up in value. 
You were doing a spreadsheet every month or whatever and it was going up and up…But you 
weren’t evaluating risk at all. It sounds crazy but you weren’t really looking at yields or 
anything. You were just thinking I will get out of this whenever I sell it in 6 months, a year or 2 
years. I will make money of it and I think everyone sort of became conditioned to that mind set” 
(PD5).  
The consensus amongst the respondents was again that finance was more freely available over this 
period and there was a shift towards increased leverage and the use of riskier facilities. First, regarding 
increased availability, six developers described the ease of access and believed that bank staff were 
under pressure to lend and incentivised through various remuneration packages. For example, one 
developer commented, “Just anybody that you rang up- everybody wanted to give you credit. The bank 
staff were on commission to get more loans out and were incentivised to do that” (PD1).  Others (n=5) 
described scenarios in which banks operating in the region actively pursued them to avail of finance. 
This signalled a corresponding shift in lender behaviour: 
“There would have been no doubt that they were throwing money at you. I remember the 
relationship manager was going on a three-week holiday and he rang the day before he went 
to see if I needed money in case I decided to buy something while he was away” (PD7). 
“I recall one situation where I received a call basically to let us know that there was money 
there for us to spend. ‘Is there anything you are looking at?’  That type of thing, ‘because you 
got more finance available here” (PD2).  
Secondly, the ability to borrow on equity was one of the recurrent themes that emerged and operated as 
follows: “Land was increasing at a fairly rapid rate and if you had land in your portfolio, the banks 
would have taken the value of that land currently. So if it had increased in value that could be deemed 
as your equity in going to purchase other land” (PD2). The increasing valuations of current assets 
resulted in the release of funds. The ability to lend on equity had the effect of making transactions feel 
more abstract or surreal and downplayed the risk attached. For example, interviewees commented:  
“Lending on equity was the big thing. It was all on paper. It affected everybody. There was no 
money, it was all just written down on paper and climbing and climbing” (PD4). 
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“It was all paper profits; it wasn’t actually real. There was a lot of credit there but a lot of the 
stuff wasn’t actually real money. I was sitting down working out exactly how much my portfolio 
was worth and it was nearly double from what I bought it but until you sold that, it was just 
paper money like. It wasn’t actually real” (PD5).  
Others indicated the increasing appetite for risk across market participants by describing how 
developers began self-perpetuating prices in the marketplace so they could avail of more finance. To 
illustrate, one developer commented:  
“Some people acted recklessly…One building company, they self-perpetuated the situation in 
certain areas. Say they bought a piece of ground and the next piece of ground that came up for 
sale in that area, they deliberately paid a lot more for it. And then they said to the bank, ‘Well 
our first piece is now worth the same amount per acre’” (PD2). 
The increasing use of SPVs as vehicles to obtain non-recourse loans was another common theme to 
emerge. For example, one developer commented: 
“There would have been a lot of that where each different purchase made, there would have 
been a company set up for that purchase and in a lot of cases were getting a 100% finance and 
then rolling the interest on it. So the banks left themselves totally exposed on that. I don’t think 
you will see that again but it was quite prominent back then” (PD2).  
The interviews conducted with the lenders were also suggestive of more aggressive market behaviour 
from the mid-2000s onwards. Banks (n=5) also acknowledged an increased reliance on asset value 
based lending models: “the problem with that type of lending as it turns out, and arguably as we should 
have known, is that there was absolutely no cash flow associated with it” (BAI1) and “It was all asset 
based lending meaning that there was no cash flow to cover it” (BDI2). The availability of unsecured 
debt was also a common theme to emerge from the interviews. Four interviewees stated that loans, 
particularly those at the higher end of the scale and those provided near the end of the boom, were 
unsecured or supported only by personal guarantees (PGs). Those supported only by guarantees were 
viewed as particularly problematic in hindsight as there had been oversights regarding reliability and 
inadequate checks in terms of cross-collateralisation. This is exemplified in the following comment; 
“One bank has led to another one and what you will find is that the person has gone to various different 
lenders. They have raised equity and then have got several PGs and one thing has paid of another” 
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(BCI2). The increased use of interest roll-up facilities over this period was again raised and these bank 
officials emphasised how these products were almost entirely dependent on “the ability to sell an asset 
rather than generate sustainable profits” (BEI1). The use of interest roll-up facilities without due 
consideration of the implications and the issues surrounding PGs are again indicative of the laxer 
lending policies over this period. 
The main findings and key behavioural factors that could be used as policy triggers in future are 
summarised below in Table 1.  
<<INSERT TABLE 1>> 
6. Discussion 
The main findings of this study are consistent with Minsky’s endogenous theory of financial crises 
which maintains that the pro-cyclical expansion and contraction of credit plays an essential role in the 
development and evolution of financial crises. More specifically, the qualitative accounts offered by 
the respondents highlight the interconnectedness of the financial and real sectors and, illustrate that the 
behaviours of key economic agents in NI altered over the course of the recent business cycle in the 
manner described in Minsky’s framework. 
At the trough of the business cycle taken as the 1990s, both the borrowers and lenders displayed 
characteristics consistent with hedge units as per Minsky’s FIH (Minsky, 1992). Property developers 
demonstrated robust investment strategies and indicated that their debt-to-income levels remained 
relatively low with maximum LTV ratios of 70% the norm. The banks also showed hedge like 
behaviours. This was illustrated through their adoption of stringent lending policies and practices and 
portfolio diversification strategies.   
However, from 2000 onward the transition to more speculative positions is apparent in the behaviours 
of these economic agents. The property developers altered their investment strategies and market 
practices placing less emphasis on income generation and more on capital appreciation. They described 
their increased reliance on debt financing in various forms with many holding the view that ease of 
access to debt finance was central to market inflation. These agents also drew attention to the entry of 
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“inexperienced” individuals to the market and indicated that herding behaviours were present. These 
comments resonate with Minsky’s references to “animal spirits” during the boom phase. The banks 
adoption of more speculative positions over this was apparent primarily in the increased concentration 
of lending in the property sector. Their increased focus on asset based lending, the introduction of more 
innovative products and the increasing use of relationship lending also fit with the behaviour of 
speculative units as per Minsky’s FIH (Minsky, 1992).  
As the end of the business cycle approached again the property developers and banks in NI signalled a 
shift toward more Ponzi positions. Through their “buy to hold” strategies, the property developers 
demonstrated their reliance on the continuation of capital appreciation in the property market to sustain 
their operations and more importantly to meet maturing obligations. Almost all of the property 
developers emphasised their increased use of debt, in particular through interest roll-up products and 
their abuse of lending on equity, to sustain their operations. Pollin (1997) identifies such behavioural 
traits as highly consistent with Minsky’s Ponzi units. The banks also displayed characteristics consistent 
with Ponzi units. Alongside confirming that lending standards had further deteriorated over this period, 
the increasing prevalence of unsecured lending and interest roll-up facilities which were entirely 
dependent on capital appreciation was raised.  Interestingly, the overarching reasons put forward by the 
lenders and borrowers for the decline in lending standards post 2000, related to increased competition 
and shareholder pressure in the sector. Again these further support Minsky’s view that instability is 
created internally through the nature of the financial system.  
Overall, the findings correspond well with Minsky’s account in that the primary factors identified where 
endogenous and related to the internal dynamics of the capitalist financial structure. Although it could 
be argued that exogenous factors may have played an aggravating role, the interview findings conclude 
that these were not fundamental in the NI crisis. Rather the NI economy slowly transitioned to a 
financing regime as per Minsky’s (1992) account that increased the fragility of the overall economy 
and left it vulnerable to a debt deflationary cycle. Therefore, as a consequence of the research a practical 
recommendation is the need for stricter policies regarding commercial lending, the implementation of 
more comprehensive risk management systems and overall a more robust supervisory framework to 
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monitor the behaviours of financial institutions over the course of the full business cycle. These 
measures would enable policymakers and regulators to identify such shifts in behaviours much earlier 
thus to respond in a timely and appropriate manner.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper presents the results of a qualitative study investigating the relevance of Minsky’s FIH in 
explaining the recent property crisis in NI. The findings show that Minsky’s framework explains the 
incidents observed in NI’s property market and highlights key triggers identified in the NI case. These 
key policy triggers could be adopted on a more general level to help identify an economy’s position in 
relation to the business cycle and therefore, could act as early warnings in pre-empting future financial 
crises. Overall, this paper provides further support for Minsky’s view (1992) that capitalist structures 
are inherently fragile and shift from states of stability to fragility overtime due to endogenous 
destabilising factors.  
There are limitations to the analysis presented here as the focus is limited to the core of the FIH. Despite 
this, the behaviours documented are consistent with Minsky’s framework suggesting there may be merit 
in considering Minsky’s broader theoretical works in seeking to understand the NI crisis and more 
broadly, other financial crises. Specifically, Minsky (1996) discussed the slow transformation of the 
financial system towards what he termed “money market capitalism”. This research identifies a need 
for a more comprehensive study of the NI case, similar to that undertaken by Wray (2009, 2011) in the 
US context, which takes into account historical developments including deregulation and other key 
changes in macroeconomic conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Footnotes 
[1] Based on population 
[2] Previous studies have documented that the regional property markets of the UK tend to exhibit 
distinct behaviours (for example see MacLennan et al., 1994; Muellbauer and Murphy, 1997; Meen, 
1999). These behaviours are typically attributed to heterogeneous regional housing markets, economic 
structures and varying local characteristics and are often amplified by homogenous UK government 
housing and monetary policies.  
[3] During this period there were a number of house price indices measuring house price movements in 
NI. The peak-to-trough decline of over 50% (specifically 57%) documented here is based on the NI 
Residential Property Price Index (2007 Q3 – 2013 Q1) developed by LPS/NISRA and widely regarded 
as the most reliable since its development.  
[4] While in quantitative studies asymptotic theory provides the basis for determining appropriate 
sample size for analysis, no similar framework for qualitative interview based studies exist (see 
Sandelowski, 1995; Malterud et al., 2016 for full discussion on this). In this context, while there 
continues to be much debate over what constitutes an appropriate sample size, in general sample sizes 
tend to be much smaller (Mason, 2010). In this study, interviews were conducted with members of each 
strata until additional data did not appear to shed much further light on the issue under investigation, 
i.e. until the point of diminishing returns/data saturation was reached (see Fusch and Ness, 2015 for a 
detailed account on data saturation in qualitative research). The final sample size of 20 was reached 
taking into account the scope of the study (aim), the nature of the topic (sensitive), the quality of the 
data extracted (richness of the data obtained from the convenience yet purposeful sampling), the overall 
study design and triangulation of the data (multiple strata in the sample).    
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